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Class action litigation is much different today than when the
modem version of Rule 23 was enacted in 1966.1 Certainly, with the
explosion of products liability litigation as well as the increase in civil
rights litigation, courts are tested as never before to stay true to the
text and spirit of Rule 23. The drafters of modem Rule 23 made
provisions for class actions seeking equitable relief, as reflected by
Rule 23(b)(2). Additionally, the drafters made provisions for class
actions seeking legal relief in Rule 23(b)(3). However, for a class
seeking both equitable and legal relief, which will be referred to in
this note as a hybrid class, class certification under Rule 23(b)(2)' has
become increasingly difficult after recent Supreme Court and Court
of Appeals decisions.' This note looks at the class certification
* J.D., University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2002; B.S. California
State University, Sacramento. I would like to thank Dean Mary Kay Kane for her
assistance and support, as well as her expertise, which she lent to me on more than one
occasion. I would also like to thank the Honorable William W. Schwarzer for his time and
commentary on later drafts of this Note.
1. FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
2. Id.
3. See Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 848 (1999) (holding that due process is
violated when an absent party has his claims for monetary relief litigated without being
given notice and an opportunity to opt-out of the proceeding); Jefferson v. Ingersoll Int'l
Inc., 195 F.3d 894 (7th Cir. 1999) (upholding Citgo's rule that monetary relief must be
incidental to the injunctive relief to certify a Rule 23(b)(2) class. The court does leave
open the possibility for Rule 23(b)(2) hybrid classes as well as bifurcated proceedings);
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problems facing courts today when confronted with a class that is
seeking injunctive as well as monetary relief. Part I highlights the
nature and source of the problem. Part II discusses how courts have
dealt with the problem both before and after the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Ortiz.4 Finally, in part III, possible
solutions to the problem are presented.
I. The Problem with "Hybrid" Certification
Rule 23(b)(2) allows a class to be certified when the relief being
sought is injunctive or declaratory in nature The advisory
committee note to Rule 23 states that "subdivision [(b)(2)] is
intended to reach situations where a party has taken action or refused
to take action with respect to a class, and final relief of an injunctive
nature or of a corresponding declaratory nature... is appropriate."6
The advisory committee's note goes on to say that "[(b)(2)] does not
extend to cases in which the appropriate final relief relates exclusively
or predominantly to money damages."7  The text of the advisory
committee's note appears, on its face, to authorize the certification of
a Rule 23(b)(2) class seeking both injunctive and monetary relief,
assuming the monetary relief is not "exclusive" or does not
"predominate." Whether certain relief does or does not predominate
is certainly ambiguous when one considers the large number of
potential sources and types of relief that may be sought by a class.
The question of whether the monetary relief predominates in a hybrid
action has been one that courts have not treated consistently.'
Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402,416-21 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding that a Rule
23(b)(2) action can only be certified where the monetary relief sought is incidental to the
injunctive relief sought. Also, the court held that a bifurcated hybrid certification could
not be certified due to, among other things, Seventh Amendment concerns. See infra, note
118. Finally, the court held that a Rule 23(b)(3) class could not be certified because the
individual damage issues predominated over the common class wide issues.).
4. 527 U.S. 815.
5. Rule 23(b)(2) reads: "[An action may be maintained as a class action if] the party
opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class,
thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with
respect to the class as a whole." FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2). Additionally, the class must
meet the four prerequisites (numerosity, commonality, typicality & adequacy of
representation) under Rule 23(a). FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a).
6. FED. R. Civ. P. 23 advisory committee's note.
7. Id.
8. Compare Allison, 151 F.3d at 415 ("monetary relief predominates in (b)(2) class
actions unless it is incidental to requested injunctive or declaratory relief"), with Robinson
v. Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co., 267 F.3d 147, 164 (2d Cir. 2001), cert. denied, (2002)
(quoting Allison, 151 F.3d at 430 (Dennis, J., dissenting)) (Rule 23(b)(2) certification is
appropriate when the "positive weight or value [to the plaintiffs] of the injunctive or
declaratory relief sought is predominant even though compensatory or punitive damages
are also claimed.").
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Indeed, at least one court has actually certified a Rule 23(b)(2) class
after finding that the monetary relief sought predominated over the
injunctive relief, in direct conflict with the advisory committee's note.'
Both courts and commentators have stated "that determining
whether one form of relief predominates in some quantifiable sense is
a wasteful and impossible task that should be avoided."'" That does
not solve the problem, however, because many statutory actions
today allow for both equitable and monetary relief and courts must
consider the requirements of Rule 23 before certifying a class based
on any such statute."
Actions that cannot be certified under Rule 23(b)(2) due to the
fact that the class is seeking predominantly monetary relief may be
certified under Rule 23(b)(3) if the court finds that the "questions of
law or fact common to the members of the class predominate over
any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class
action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient
adjudication of the controversy.""2  When compared to the
requirements for a (b)(2) certification, the (b)(3) class has the
increased requirements of predominance and superiority. This higher
hurdle is a result of the additional findings'3 that a court must make in
order to certify a Rule 23(b)(3) class, findings that are unnecessary
when certifying a Rule 23(b)(2) class. This makes sense when one
considers the fact that a Rule 23(b)(3) class is generally certified to
adjudicate class members' damage claims, 4 which implicate more due
process concerns than do equitable claims.'5
Additionally, under Rule 23(c)(2), the court, when certifying a
class under (b)(3), must give the individual class members notice and
9. In re Cincinnati Radiation Litig., 187 F.R.D. 549, 554 (S.D. Ohio 1999).
10. Parker v. Time Warner Entm't Co., 198 F.R.D. 374, 378 (E.D.N.Y. 2001); see also
HERBERT B. NEWBERG & ALBA CONTE, NEWBERG ON CLASS AC1IONS § 4.14 (3d ed.
1992); 7A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1775 (2d ed. 1986).
11. Robinson, 267 F.3d at 162 (failure to follow proper legal standards in certifying a
class is an abuse of discretion).
12. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). The rule states that matters to be considered when
making the predominance and superiority findings are:
(A) the interest of members of the class in individually controlling the
prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any
litigation concerning the controversy already commenced by or against members
of the class; (C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of
the claims in the particular forum; (D) the difficulties likely to be encountered in
the management of a class action.
Id.
13. Id.; cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2).
14. See WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 10, § 1777.
15. See Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 846 (1999).
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a right to opt-out of the litigation if they so choose.'6 The
requirements of notice and opt-out are what pressure plaintiffs, and
defendants in some circumstances, to seek certification under Rule
23(b)(2). That is because notice is an additional cost to be borne by
the plaintiffs and the right to opt-out of the litigation increases the
possibility that the action will not finally resolve the dispute.
Therefore, under Rule 23 it is appropriate for a class seeking
injunctive relief to certify under subsection (b)(2) and for a class
seeking monetary relief to certify under subsection (b)(3). The
problem, which will be discussed below, arises in those cases in which
the class is seeking "mixed" relief, or a combination of injunctive and
monetary relief, so-called hybrid classes.
The hybrid class problem has been amplified in recent years as a
result of Congress' passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991.'" That act
added compensatory and punitive damages as additional remedies
available to plaintiffs suing under Title VII for intentional
discrimination." As such, there has been a tremendous amount of
litigation concerning class certification under Title VII because most
plaintiff Title VII classes now seek both an injunction to stop the
discriminatory practices complained of as well as compensatory and
punitive damages.'9 Courts have struggled with how to certify these
types of hybrid classes, with results that range from denying
certification to allowing the entire class to proceed under Rule
23(b)(2). Several courts have noted that certification of hybrid
classes raises both due process and Seventh Amendment concerns."0
Although Title VII cases account for a significant percentage of
the class action litigation"' and an even larger percentage of the
16. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2).
17. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as amended
in scattered sections 42 U.S.C. 1981(a) (1994)).
18. See Daniel Piar, The Uncertain Future of Title VII Class Actions After the Civil
Rights Act of 1991, 2001 BYU L. REV. 305, 305-06 (2001); Lesley Frieder Wolf, Note,
Evading Friendly Fire: Achieving Class Certification After the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 100
COLUM. L. REV. 1847,1848 (2000).
19. See, e.g., Nikaa Baugh Jordan, Commentary, Allison v. Citgo Petroleum: The
Death Knell for the Title VII Class Action?, 51 ALA. L. REV. 847 (2000).
20. See Lemon v. Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, 216 F.3d 577, 581-82 (7th Cir. 2000)
(vacating district court's certification of a Title VII class under Rule 23(b)(2) and
remanding directing lower court to take into account due process and Seventh
Amendment concerns); Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 423-25 (5th Cir.
1998) (affirming district court's refusal to certify Title VII class as certification would
implicate the Seventh Amendment); Miller v. Hygrade Food Prods. Corp., 198 F.R.D. 638,
644 (E.D. Penn. 2001) (class certification is precluded citing, among other things, Seventh
Amendment concerns).
21. In 1999, of all the class actions commenced in U.S. district courts, nearly ten
percent were civil rights cases of some sort. DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE
OF THE U.S. COURTS ANN. REP. 1999, Table X-5.
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hybrid certification litigation, other types of actions also involve
hybrid classes seeking "mixed" relief. For example, prisoners have
sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983"2 to remedy alleged civil rights violations
through injunctive as well as legal relief.23 Disabled persons have
brought suit under the Americans with Disabilities Act 4 seeking an
injunction as well as the statutorily mandated damages. 5 Mortgage
borrowers brought a class action against a mortgage company under
the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Ace6 seeking both legal and
equitable relief." Also, retirees have brought suit under the
Employee Retirement Income Security Ace' (ERISA) to enjoin their
former employers from illegally managing their retirement accounts
and to recover damages as a result of the illegal management." As is
evident, hybrid certification issues arise in a variety of different
actions and, as such, a solution to this recurring problem faced by
today's federal courts is necessary.
At this point, one might wonder exactly what the problem with
hybrid certification is. The problem is best illustrated by examining
an actual case that involves a hybrid class seeking "mixed" relief.
Current and former female employees of CBS, Inc. brought suit
against their employer claiming that CBS systematically discriminated
against female employees in violation of Title VII?° Under Title VII,
the plaintiffs are allowed to seek an injunction prohibiting CBS from
discriminating against female employees in the future.3 Since Rule
23(b)(2) specifically authorizes classes to be maintained where the
final relief sought is either injunctive or declaratory,2 the class
attempted certification under (b)(2)3 Title VII also authorizes the
plaintiffs to seek monetary relief in the form of compensatory and
punitive damages. 4 In this case, the plaintiff class sought both an
22. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
23. Blyden v. Mancusi, 186 F.3d 252 (2d Cir. 1999); In re Texas Prison Litig., 191
F.R.D. 164 (W.D. Mo. 2000).
24. 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2002).
25. Murray v. Auslander, 244 F.3d 807 (11th Cir. 2001); Arnold v. United Artists
Theatre Circuit, Inc., 158 F.R.D. 439 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
26. 12 U.S.C. § 2609 (2002).
27. DeBoer v. Mellon Mortgage Co., 64 F.3d 1171 (8th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, Crehan
v. DeBoer, 517 U.S. 1156 (1996).
28. 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (2002).
29. Groover v. Michelin N. Am., Inc., 187 F.R.D. 662 (M.D. Ala. 1999); Fuller v.
Fruehauf Trailer Corp., 168 F.R.D. 588 (E.D. Mich. 1996).
30. Beckmann v. CBS, Inc., 192 F.R.D. 608, 615 (D. Minn. 2000).
31. Id.
32. FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
33. Beckmann, 192 F.R.D. at 615.
34. 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (1994); see also Wolf, supra note 18, at 1848-49.
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injunction to stop the alleged discriminatory practice as well as
compensatory and punitive damages."
As mentioned above, the court can certify a Rule 23(b)(2) class
only if it finds that the injunctive and/or declaratory relief
predominates over the monetary relief.36 Some of the Circuit Courts
have made it increasingly difficult for a district judge to find that the
injunctive relief predominates over the monetary relief,37 so the
district court in this case may have a problem certifying the hybrid
class under (b)(2). If the district judge proceeds to certify the class
under Rule 23(b)(2), the rule does not provide notice and opt-out
rights for the class members.39 Yet, the Supreme Court in Ortiz
suggested that due process may require persons having their
monetary claims adjudicated to receive notice and the ability to opt-
out." Therefore, the court must keep the individual plaintiff's due
process rights in mind, and may either deny certification or provide
absent class members some notice and opt-out rights when certifying
a Rule 23(b)(2) hybrid class."
Additionally, with respect to the damage claims, if the court finds
the monetary relief to predominate so that only a Rule 23(b)(3) class
would be feasible, it must consider whether the individual damage
determinations make a (b)(3) certification impossible because of the
lack of the predominance of common issues.42 This, too, is a difficult
area for courts because any monetary award other than statutorily
35. Beckmann, 192 F.R.D. at 615.
36. FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee's note.
37. Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 415 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding that
the injunctive relief predominates over the monetary relief only if the damages sought are
"incidental" to the injunction); Murray v. Auslander, 244 F.3d 807, 812 (11th Cir. 2001)
(same); Jefferson v. Ingersoll Int'l, Inc., 195 F.3d 894, 898 (7th Cir. 1999) (same); but see
Robinson v. Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co., 267 F.3d 147, 164 (2d Cir. 2001), cert.
denied, 2002 U.S. LEXIS 1894 (Mar. 18, 2002) (disapproving of the "incidental" approach
taken by Allison and instead holds that the district judge must determine if the monetary
relief predominates using an ad hoe balancing approach).
38. The Supreme Court has even suggested that monetary claims may never be
appropriate under Rule 23(b)(2). Ticor Title Ins. Co. v. Brown, 511 U.S. 117, 121 (1994).
Although this was not an opinion, but rather a dismissal of certiorari, it may be an
indication of how the Supreme Court feels regarding (b)(2) certification and has been
somewhat influential. See Jefferson, 195 F.3d at 897.
39. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2).
40. Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815,846-48 (1999).
41. Rule 23(d)(2) allows the court, at its discretion, to provide for notice and opt-out
for absent class members when it is necessary "for the protection of the members of the
class or otherwise for the fair conduct of the action." FED. R. Civ. P. 23(d)(2). Therefore,
some courts have held that a Rule 23(b)(2) hybrid class could be certified while
maintaining each class member's due process rights. Robinson, 267 F.3d at 165-66;
Eubanks v. Billington, 110 F.3d 87, 93 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
42. See FED. R. CIv. P. 23(b)(3).
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mandated damages will likely involve individual determinations.43 In
this illustrative case, the court ultimately certified a hybrid class, first
"resolv[ing] the issue of liability under the procedures of Rule
23(b)(2) [and then resolving] the issue of damages ... using the 'opt-
out' procedures established for Rule 23(b)(3) actions."" In this way,
the court was able to effectively deal with the problem posed by the
hybrid class by using its power under Rule 23(c)(4)" to divide the
entire class into subclasses, and thereby make use of both Rule
23(b)(2) and Rule 23(b)(3). 6
II. Ways in Which Courts Have Dealt with Hybrid
Certification 7
There are five primary methods in which courts that have
certified hybrid classes have done so. 8 This section will dissect the
43. See Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402,421-22 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding
that the wide array of individual issues attendant to compensatory and punitive damages
claims implicates predominately individual-specific issues).
44. Beckmann v. CBS, Inc., 192 F.R.D. 608, 615 (D. Minn. 2000) (emphasis added). It
is interesting to note that the court used the word "procedures" when describing the
method that it would use to certify the class.
45. FED. R. CIv. P. 23.
46. Many courts have endorsed this procedure. See Lemon v. Int'l Union of Operating
Eng'rs, 216 F.3d 577, 581-82 (7th Cir. 2000); Jefferson v. Ingersoll Int'l, Inc., 195 F.3d 894,
898 (7th Cir. 1999); Thomas v. Albright, 139 F.3d 227, 234 (D.C. Cir. 1998), cert. denied,
Fields v, Albright, 525 U.S. 1016 (1998); Eubanks, 110 F.3d at 96.
47. It should be noted that many classes today are certified for settlement purposes
only, so called "settlement classes." The Supreme Court has held that a settlement class
may not be certified unless that class would be proper for trial. Amchem Prods., Inc. v.
Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 619 (1997) (noting that the only exception to its holding that the
existence of a settlement is not to be taken into consideration when certifying a class is the
lack of management problems that would be present if the case were to be tried).
Settlement classes provide an entire subset of issues that are beyond the scope of this note,
and thus will not be addressed. However, since a settlement class must independently
meet the requirements of Rule 23(a) and (b), this note will not make a distinction between
ordinary class certification and settlement class certification.
48. Courts have certified a Rule 23(b)(2) class with no notice or opt-out for the absent
class members. DeBoer v. Mellon Mortgage Co., 64 F.3d 1171, 1175 (8th Cir. 1995), cert.
denied, Crehan v. DeBoer, 517 U.S. 1156 (1996); see infra Part II (A)(1). Courts have also
certified a Rule 23(b)(2) class but have given notice and opt-out rights to absent class
members. Robinson v. Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co., 267 F.3d 147, 166-67 (2d Cir.
2001), cert. denied, 2002 U.S. LEXIS 1894 (Mar. 18,2002); see infra Part I (A)(2). Courts
have also certified a liability class under Rule 23(b)(2) but have deferred certification of
the damages issues until the resolution of the liability phase. Williams v. Empire Funding
Corp., 183 F.R.D. 428,437 (E.D. Penn. 1998); see infra Part II (A)(3). Another approach
used by courts is to bifurcate the trial, certifying the class under Rule 23(b)(2) for liability
issues and under (b)(3) for the damage issues. Ballard v. Equifax Check Serv., Inc., 186
F.R.D. 589, 596-600 (E.D. Cal. 1999); see infra Part II (A)(4). Courts have also certified
the entire action under Rule 23(b)(3). Ansoumana v. Gristede's Operating Corp., 201
F.R.D. 81, 88 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); see infra Part II (A)(5).
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various ways in which courts have certified hybrid actions and assess
the benefits and drawbacks to each approach. Before a court can
decide which approach to take with a hybrid class, however, it must
determine whether the monetary relief sought predominates over the
injunctive and declaratory relief sought, as dictated by the advisory
committee note to Rule 23(b)(2). 9
Predominance Under Rule 23(b)(2)
One of the most talked about recent decisions among the
commentators" regarding the predominance requirement of Rule
23(b)(2) classes has been Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp." In that
case, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision to not
certify the Title VII class under Rule 23(b)(2) stating that the
monetary relief must be "incidental to the requested injunctive or
declaratory relief' in order for a Rule 23(b)(2) certification to be
proper.52 The court stated that the reason for this rule was twofold:
(1) "It protects the legitimate interests of potential class members
who might wish to pursue their monetary claims individually;" and (2)
"It preserves the legal system's interest in judicial economy."53 The
court stated that incidental damages are "those to which class
members automatically would be entitled once liability to the class
(or subclass) as a whole is established."" The court went on to say
that incidental damages should not depend "in any significant way on
the intangible, subjective differences of each class member's
circumstances."5  This approach, called the incidental damages
approach,56 in effect, forecloses any possibility of certifying a hybrid
Rule 23(b)(2) class where the damages are not statutorily mandated
and easily computable without individual proof."
49. FED. R. Civ. P. 23 advisory committee's note.
50. See Harvey S. Bartlett III, Comment, Determining Whether a Title VII Plaintiffs
Class "Aim is True". The Legacy of Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp. for Employment
Discrimination Class Certification Under Rule 23(b)(2), 74 TUL. L. REV. 2163 (2000);
Jordan, supra note 19, at 867; Wolf, supra note 18, at 1851-52.
51. 151 F.3d 402 (5th Cir. 1998).




56. See Robinson v. Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co., 267 F.3d 147, 164 (2d Cir.
2001), cert. denied, 2002 U.S. LEXIS 1894 (Mar. 18, 2002). This approach has also been
endorsed by the influential Manual for Complex Litigation. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX
LITIGATION § 33.52 (3d ed. 1995) [hereinafter MANUAL].
57. Since Allison, at least one district court has found the monetary relief to be
"incidental" in a situation far different than described by the Allison court. Coleman v.
Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 196 F.R.D. 315, 322 (M.D. Tenn. 2000) (stating that it
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Other courts have rejected the rigid incidental damages approach
advocated in Allison and instead used an ad hoe balancing approach. 8
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has recently endorsed
this procedure for use with hybrid classes. 9  The ad hoc approach
allows the district court to consider all of the relevant evidence
presented by counsel, and "then assess whether (b)(2) certification is
appropriate in light of 'the relative importance of the remedies
sought, given all of the facts and circumstances of the case.' 6  The
court stated that a Rule 23(b)(2) certification would then be
appropriate if the district judge, in her discretion, finds that "(1) 'the
positive weight or value [to the plaintiffs] of the injunctive or
declaratory relief sought is predominant even though compensatory
or punitive damages are also claimed'.., and (2) class treatment
would be efficient and manageable, thereby achieving an appreciable
measure of judicial economy."'" Finally, the Second Circuit stated
that, although the predominance assessment will vary from case to
case, at a minimum the district court should:
satisfy itself of the following: (1) even in the absence of a possible
monetary recovery, reasonable plaintiffs would bring the suit to
obtain the injunctive or declaratory relief sought; and (2) the
injunctive or declaratory relief sought would be both reasonably
necessary and appropriate were the plaintiffs to succeed on the
merits.
Although the ad hoc approach will result in a much lower hurdle
for the plaintiffs to clear when seeking to certify a Rule 23(b)(2) class,
it is a very subjective standard that may be difficult to apply in many
cases. One court, applying the ad hoc approach, found that the
monetary relief sought was secondary to the equitable relief sought
because the declaratory and injunctive relief requested would affect
"more persons and have consequences over a greater period of time
than the monetary damages."63 Other courts have merely stated that
the injunctive relief predominates without engaging in further
"appears" as though the monetary relief was incidental to the injunction because money
could not remedy the alleged discriminatory practices of the defendant).
58. Robinson, 267 F.3d at 166-67; Warnell v. Ford Motor Co., 189 F.R.D. 383, 389
(N.D. Ill. 1999) (stating that the Allison court's test was dicta; also stating that there can be
no bright-line test and district courts should have discretion to determine whether
monetary relief predominates); Hoffman v. Honda of Am. Mfg., Inc., 191 F.R.D. 530, 536
(S.D. Ohio 1999) (declining to follow the Allison test stating that the advisory committee's
note merely requires the equitable relief to predominate and that should be determined
after a consideration of the evidence of predomination at a certification hearing).
59. Robinson, 267 F.3d at 164.
60. Id (quoting Hoffinan, 191 F.R.D. at 536).
61. Id (quoting Allison, 151 F.3d at 430 (Dennis, J., dissenting).
62. Id-
63. Ballard v. Equifax Check Serv., Inc., 186 F.R.D. 589, 596 (E.D. Cal. 1999).
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discussion.64 What is clear is that Rule 23(b)(2) predomination is a
concept that is defined very differently by different courts with no
clear standard emerging.
(1) Certification Under Rule 23(b)(2) Without Providing Notice or Opt-out
Some courts have certified a hybrid action under Rule 23(b)(2)
without providing the absent class members notice or an opportunity
to opt-out." Certifying a hybrid class under Rule 23(b)(2) without
giving the absent members notice or opt-out rights may be in conflict
with Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp.,66 a recent Supreme Court case which
stated that where damage claims are adjudicated in a mandatory class
it "raised the flag on [the] issue of due process."67 The flag the Court
is referring to is providing the absent members notice and the ability
to remove themselves from the litigation.68 In Ortiz, the defendant
asbestos manufacturer was attempting to certify a global settlement of
all the personal injury claims against it under Rule 23(b)(1)(B), the
so-called limited fund class.69  The court reasoned that where
mandatory class actions, such as actions certified under Rule
23(b)(1)(B), aggregate damage claims, the due process principle that
"one is not bound by a judgment in personam... [when] he is not
designated as a party or.. . has not been made a party by service of
process" is implicated." The court went on to state that the "inherent
tension between representative suits and the day-in-court ideal is only
magnified if applied to damage claims gathered in a mandatory class,"
because the "legal rights of the absent class members.. . are resolved
regardless either of their consent, or.. . their express wish to the
contrary."71 The court in that case was deciding the due process issue
with respect to a mandatory Rule 23(b)(1)(B) class, but the force of
the statement is much the same in the (b)(2) context.72 Therefore, it is
64. See e.g., In re Texas Prison Litig., 191 F.R.D. 164, 179 (W.D. Mo. 2000).
65. See DeBoer v. Mellon Mortgage Co., 64 F.3d 1171, 1175 (8th Cir. 1995), cert.
denied, Crehan v. DeBoer, 517 U.S. 1156 (1996); Christ v. Beneficial Corp., 195 F.R.D. 684
(M.D. Ala. 2000); In re Texas Prison Litig., 191 F.R.D. 164 (W.D. Mo. 2000); Borcherding-
Dittloff v. Transworld Sys., Inc., 185 F.R.D. 558 (W.D. Wis. 1999); Groover v. Michelin N.
Am., Inc., 187 F.R.D. 662 (M.D. Ala. 1999); Broussard v. Foti, No. 00-2318, 2001 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 8564 (E.D. La. June 18, 2001).
66. 527 U.S. 815 (1999).
67. Id. at 847.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 823-28.
70. Id. at 846 (emphasis in original) (quoting Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40
(1940)).
71. Id. at 846-47.
72. Id. At least one court has applied Ortiz's reasoning to a Rule 23(b)(2) class.
Rockey v. Courtesy Motors, Inc., 199 F.R.D. 578, 595-96 (W.D. Mich. 2001) (stating that
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questionable whether a court may ever certify a hybrid Rule 23(b)(2)
class without giving some form of notice and opt-out rights to the
absent class members. 3
Nevertheless, courts since Ortiz have certified Rule 23(b)(2)
classes that were seeking both injunctive and monetary relief without
giving notice and opt-out rights to the absent class members." In a
pre-Ortiz case, a district court certified a class of mortgage borrowers
that were seeking both damages and an injunction against a mortgage
servicer that was engaging in alleged illegal practices." The
certification for the "settlement only" class was made over the
objection of five of the potential class members who wished to be
excluded from the class. Those class members appealed the district
judge's certification order claiming, among other things, that they had
a due process right to opt-out of the litigation." The Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that the certification was proper
both under the rules and as a matter of constitutional law. 8 The court
stated that "[a]ny potential unfairness to the [appellants] in
compromising their claims is 'outweighed by the purposes behind
class actions: eliminating the possibility of repetitious litigation and
providing small claimants with a means of obtaining redress for claims
too small to justify individual litigation."'79 The court also expressed a
preference for certifying the class under Rule 23(b)(2) when both
(b)(2) and (b)(3) may be used stating that this "avoid[s] unnecessary
inconsistencies and compromises in future litigation."8
"[t]he court may not use a mandatory Rule 23(b)(2) class as an expedient to circumvent
the requirements of Rule 23(b)(3), where the case is principally one for money damages").
73. One approach used by a court that certified a hybrid class under Rule 23(b)(2)
without allowing opt-out rights was to provide absent class members with notice of the
proposed settlement and class members with the ability to voice concerns over the fairness
of the proposed settlement. Williams v. Burlington N., Inc., 832 F.2d 100, 104 (7th Cir.
1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 991 (1988). The court stated that the district court's approach
to allow concerns to be heard by a special master and to hold fairness hearings when
appropriate satisfied due process concerns. Id. Of course, this case was decided before
the Supreme Court's decision in Ortiz. 527 U.S. 815.
74. See Christ v. Beneficial Corp., 195 F.R.D. 684, 694-95 (M.D. Ala. 2000); In re
Texas Prison Litig., 191 F.R.D. 164, 171-72 (W.D. Mo. 2000) (giving notice but no option
to opt-out of the proposed settlement). See also Coleman v. Gen. Motors Acceptance
Corp., 196 F.R.D. 315, 322-23 (M.D. Tenn. 2000) (certifying hybrid class under Rule
23(b)(2) without mentioning opt-out or notice).
75. DeBoer v. Mellon Mortgage Co., 64 F.3d 1171, 1173 (8th Cir. 1995), cert. denied,
Crehan v. DeBoer, 517 U.S. 1156 (1996).
76. Id. at 1174.
77. Id. at 1175.
78. Id.
79. Id. (citations omitted).
80. Id. See also WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 10, § 1775.
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One distinguishing characteristic between Deboer and other
hybrid certification cases is the fact that the monetary relief for
individual class members would be too small to support bringing
separate actions.81 Using the reasoning of Ortiz, however, the size of
the individual awards shouldn't make a difference. On the other
hand, practically speaking, it would be unlikely that an individual
would bring suit individually if the size of the award would not be
enough to cover the costs of litigation. Therefore, the size of the
individual recovery for each class member has in the past, and may in
the future, guide courts when deciding whether to grant a hybrid class
notice and opt-out rights.
Aside from the constitutional problems with this approach, there
may be other rule based problems with it. In Eubanks v. Billington,
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed a
district judge's decision declining to provide absent class members
opt-out rights in a Title VII action."2 The court expressed doubts
about this approach, however, stating that "the underlying premise of
(b)(2) certification-that the class members suffer from a common
injury that can be addressed by classwide relief-begins to break
down when the class seeks to recover back pay or other forms of
monetary damages to be allocated based on individual injuries." 3 In
a later decision, the D.C. Circuit elaborated on the previous decision,
stating that an example of an improper Rule 23(b)(2) certification
would be where the "amounts claimed by various class members...
[are] so disparate as to create a conflict of interest."" These
81. DeBoer, 64 F.3d at 1175. In other instances where the court has certified a Rule
23(b)(2) class without giving notice and opt-out rights to absent class members, the
monetary relief being sought was too small for the individual class members to bring
separate actions. See Christ v. Beneficial Corp., 195 F.R.D. 684, 695 (M.D. Ala. 2000)
(certifying Rule 23(b)(2) class without notice and opt-out rights to absent class members
where amount of recovery for each plaintiff would be as low as $4.00. The court was also
persuaded by the fact that the damages were similar in nature to restitution); Borcherding-
Dittloff v. Transworld Sys., Inc., 185 F.R.D. 558, 566 (W.D. Wis. 1999) (stating that the
maximum amount that each plaintiff could receive is 13 cents); Gammon v. GC Serv. Ltd.
P'ship, 162 F.R.D. 313, 320-21 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (certifying settlement class under Rule
23(b)(2), without notice or opt-out to absent class members where each plaintiff would
receive "approximately 13 cents"). But see Eubanks v. Billington, 110 F.3d 87, 99 (D.C.
Cir. 1997) (holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion to certify a Rule
23(b)(2) class without opt-out rights where the total amount to be distributed among the
class members was $8.5 million. Individual class members could not receive more than
$20,000); In re Texas Prison Litig., 191 F.R.D. 164, 169-70 (W.D. Mo. 2000) (certifying a
Rule 23(b)(2) class with no notice and opt-out rights for absent class members where the
amount to be distributed among 2100 class members was $1,020,000).
82. 110F.3d at 99.
83. Id. at 95.
84. Thomas v. Albright, 139 F.3d 227, 236 (D.C. Cir. 1998), cert. denied, Fields v.
Albright, 525 U.S. 1016 (1998).
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statements, taken together, suggest that any time the damages sought
are not uniform throughout the class, Rule 23(b)(2) certification
without some other form of protection for the class members may not
be appropriate.
Another problem that certification under Rule 23(b)(2) without
notice and opt-out rights may raise is the potential that the judgment
may not have preclusive effect as to the absent class members
monetary claims. Some courts have held that where the absent class
member is not given the opportunity to opt-out of the action, that
person's due process rights are violated if the judgment is
subsequently given res judicata effect as to that person's monetary
claims." These results would cause a tremendous waste of judicial
and party resources. Further, courts have refused to give preclusive
effects to a judgment where the notice given did not satisfy the
requirements of Rule 23(c)(2), even when absent class members were
given the right to opt-out. 6
(2) Certification Under Rule 23(b) (2) While Providing Notice and Opt-out
Rights
Rule 23(d)(2) and (d)(5) gives the district court discretion to give
the absent class members opt-out rights and notice if needed for their
protection or for fairness." Courts have frequently invoked these
provisions to give notice and opt-out rights to absent class members
in Rule 23(b)(2) certifications where both injunctive and monetary
relief was sought.88 Before the court gets to this point, however, the
court must decide whether, as the advisory committee's note dictates,
the injunctive relief sought predominates over the monetary relief
sought. 9 Indeed, this decision must be made before the court certifies
85. Frank v. United Airlines, Inc., 216 F.3d 845, 851-52 (9th Cir. 2000), cert. denied,
532 U.S. 914 (2001); Brown v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 982 F.2d 386, 392 (9th Cir. 1992), cert.
dismissed, 511 U.S. 117 (1994).
86. Twigg v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 153 F.3d 1222, 1228 (11th Cir. 1998) (holding that
newspaper notice alone was not sufficient to satisfy the requirements of Rule 23(c)(2) and
refusing to give preclusive effect to the judgment in the prior case).
87. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(d)(2), (5). See Robinson v. Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co.,
267 F.3d 147, 166-67 (2d Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 2002 U.S. LEXIS 1894 (Mar. 18, 2002)
(holding that the district court has discretion under Rule 23(d)(2) to give notice and opt-
out rights to absent class members in (b)(1) and (b)(2) classes); Eubanks, 110 F.3d at 96
(holding that Rule 23(d)(5) is broad enough to permit the district court to allow individual
class members the right to opt-out of a (b)(1) or (b)(2) class); see also supra note 48.
88. See In re Visa Check/Mastermoney Antitrust Litig., 192 F.R.D. 68 (E.D.N.Y.
2000), aff'd, No. 00-7699, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 22480 (2d Cir. 2001); Robinson v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 111 F. Supp. 2d 1101, 1127-28 (E.D. Ark. 2000); Fuller v. Fruehauf Trailer
Corp., 168 F.R.D. 588 (E.D. Mich. 1996); Arnold v. United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc.,
158 F.R.D. 439 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
89. FED. R. Civ. P. 23 advisory committee's note; see supra notes 50-64. At least one
court has certified a Rule 23(b)(2) class after finding that the monetary relief
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a Rule 23(b)(2) class, whether notice and opt-out rights are provided
or not." If a court finds that the monetary relief predominates over
the injunctive relief sought, then the court may consider alternate
approaches, such as bifurcating the class or certification solely under
Rule 23(b)(3).9
Assuming that the district judge finds the equitable relief to
predominate over the legal relief, the court is free to certify an
otherwise appropriate Rule 23(b)(2) class. Most circuits have held
that district judges have the discretion to permit opt-outs in Rule
23(b)(1)92 and (b)(2) actions.93 Generally, courts have exercised their
discretion to give the absent class members notice and the right to
opt-out when they have found potential due process concerns. 4
Indeed, after Ortiz, providing absent class members with the right to
opt-out of the litigation may be required. Some courts have allowed
predominated over the injunctive relief sought. In re Cincinnati Radiation Litig., 187
F.R.D. 549, 554-55 (S.D. Ohio 1999). This appears to be an isolated case and probably
does not comport with the prevailing jurisprudence on (b)(2) certification.
90. See Jefferson v. Ingersoll Int'l, Inc., 195 F.3d 894, 898 (7th Cir. 1999) (Rule
23(b)(2) action only appropriate where the monetary relief is incidental to the equitable
remedy); Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 410-11 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding
that the primary limitation in a Rule 23(b)(2) class is the requirement that the injunctive
relief must predominate over the monetary relief); Eubanks 110 F.3d at 92 ("(b)(2) classes
[are permitted] to recover monetary relief in addition to declaratory or injunctive relief, at
least where the monetary relief does not predominate").
91. See infra Part II A(3), (4), & (5).
92. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1).
93. Robinson v. Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co., 267 F.3d 147, 166-67 (2d Cir. 2001),
cert. denied, 2002 U.S. LEXIS 1894 (Mar. 18, 2002); Jefferson, 195 F.3d at 898 (stating that
"the judge could treat a rule 23(b)(2) class as if it were under Rule 23(b)(3), giving notice
and an opportunity to opt-out on the authority of Rule 23(d)(2)"); Linney v. Cellular
Alaska P'ship, 151 F.3d 1234, 1242 n.6 (9th Cir. 1998) (Rule 23(b)(2) does not require
notice and opt-out but court in its discretion may provide for notice and opt-out);
Eubanks, 110 F.3d at 94 (district court has the discretion to "grant opt-out rights in (b)(1)
and (b)(2) class actions"); Penson v. Terminal Transp. Co., 634 F.2d 989, 994 (5th Cir.
1981) (district court may require that notice and opt-out rights are given).
94. See In re Cincinnati Radiation Litig., 187 F.R.D. at 555 (stating that providing
notice and opt-out to absent class members "alleviates this Court's concerns about due
process"); Fuller v. Fruehauf Trailer Corp., 168 F.R.D. 588, 605 (E.D. Mich. 1996) (citing
due process concerns as a reason for allowing notice and opt-out rights for the absent class
members in a Rule 23(b)(2) certification).
95. See Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 847 (1999). The Allison court has
taken a hard-line approach to this issue which could make a Rule 23(b)(2) certification
inappropriate in all cases where Ortiz would mandate notice and opt-out rights. The court
stated that "monetary relief 'predominates' under Rule 23(b)(2) when its presence in the
litigation suggests that the procedural safeguards of notice and opt-out are necessary."
Allison, 151 F.3d at 413. Although this decision was prior to the Supreme Court's decision
in Ortiz, the court's approach today would effectively bar any (b)(2) certification if the
class is seeking monetary relief. Some post-Ortiz decisions have not taken this approach
to heart and have followed more traditional jurisprudence in allowing a Rule 23(b)(2)
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class members the right to opt-out of the litigation with respect to the
damage claims only and have disallowed opt-outs for the remainder
of the litigation." Regardless of the form that this type of certification
takes, it can be an efficient way for a court to not only satisfy the rule-
based requirements, but also the constitutional concerns that
underlie all class action certifications.
The biggest problem that this type of certification presents to
courts is the possibility that the damages being sought by the class
may break down the "assumption of cohesiveness.. . that justifies
certification as a (b)(2) class.""7 This break down in cohesiveness may
occur as a result of any individual differences in damages that class
members may claim.98 A catch-22 may arise when the idea that a
Rule 23(b)(2) class be cohesive is compared with the requirement of
"predominance" under Rule 23(b)(3).9 Essentially, the court may
conclude that the damage claims destroy the cohesiveness required
for a Rule 23(b)(2) action and at the same time are sufficiently
individual so as to not satisfy the predominance requirement of Rule
23(b)(3), therefore making the action unsuitable for class treatment.
However, this result may show that the rules are actually having the
effect that was intended, as not all potential actions are suitable for
class treatment.
(3) Certify a Rule 23(b) (2) Class for Liability Only and Defer Certification
of Damages
The next two types of hybrid certifications that courts have used
involve some form of splitting the trial into two different phases, or
bifurcating the trial. ' The authority for this procedure is found in
Rule 23(c)(4)."' Rule 23(c)(4) gives the court broad authority to
certification where notice and opt-out rights are given. See Lemon v. Int'l Union of
Operating Eng'rs, 216 F.3d 577, 582 (7th Cir. 2000).
96. In re Visa Check/Mastermoney Antitrust Litig., 192 F.R.D. 68, 89 (E.D.N.Y. 2000),
aff'd, No. 00-7699, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 22480 (2d Cir. 2001); Arnold v. United Artists
Theatre Circuit, Inc., 158 F.R.D. 439, 464-65 (N.C. Cal. 1994). Indeed, at least one circuit
has held that opt-out can only be given with respect to the damage portion of the action
where mixed relief is sought. Cox v. Am. Cast Iron Pipe Co., 784 F.2d 1546, 1554 (11th
Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 883 (1986).
97. Eubanks, 110 F.3d at 96.
98. Allison, 151 F.3d at 402.
99. FED. R. CIv. P. 23(b)(3); see infra, Part II (A)(4), (5). The "predominance"
requirement of Rule 23(b)(3) is found in the text of the rule: An action may be
maintained as a class action if "the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to
the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual
members." FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).
100. See WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 10, §§ 1775, 1790; NEWBERG &
CONTE, supra note 10, § 4.14.
101. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4). The rule states, in pertinent part, that "[w]hen
appropriate (A) an action may be brought or maintained as a class action with respect to
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divide the certification as necessary within the confines of the rule.'2
Instead of certifying the entire action in the initial stages of the
litigation, some courts have chosen to certify only the liability portion
of the action under Rule 23(b)(2) and defer certification of the
requested damages until the resolution of the first phase.' Although
this procedure has not been attempted with much frequency, courts
have used it in the Title VII context where it was unclear how the
monetary relief portion of the suit could be certified.' 4 Additionally,
where the court finds the monetary relief to predominate, it may
sever the trial into distinct phases and try only the liability' 5 and
equitable relief issues first."0 6
The Fifth Circuit in Allison expressly disallowed this procedure
in cases where there is "no foreseeable likelihood that the claims for
compensatory and punitive damages could be certified."'0 7 The court
stated that the plaintiffs proposal to sever out the individual issues in
the first phase in order to resolve liability on a class-wide basis does
not comport with Rule 23(c)(4) because such a reading would
"eviscerate the predominance requirement of Rule 23(b)(3)."'' 8 The
court did, however, allow the plaintiffs to proceed with this procedure
with respect to their "disparate impact" claim. 9 It is unclear from the
court's decision, however, why the entire action could not have been
initially certified under Rule 23(b)(2) as both the disparate impact
and "pattern-or-practice" claim asserted by the plaintiffs, if proven,
would entitle the class to injunctive relief.
particular issues, or (B) a class may be divided into subclasses and each subclass treated as
a class, and the provisions of this rule shall be construed and applied accordingly." Id.
102. Id.
103. See Williams v. Empire Funding Corp., 183 F.R.D. 428, 437 (E.D. Pa. 1998)
(conditionally certifying Rule 23(b)(2) class seeking a declaration of right to rescind under
TILA and deferring certification of Rule 23(b)(3) damages class until resolution of first
phase); Morgan v. United Parcel Serv. Of Am., Inc., 169 F.R.D. 349, 358 (E.D. Mo. 1996)
(certifying Rule 23(b)(2) class with respect to liability and deferring certification of
damages until termination of liability phase); Gelb v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 150 F.R.D. 76,
79-80 (S.D. N.Y. 1993) (same); Butler v. Home Depot, Inc., No. C-94-4335, 1997 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 16296, at *52 (N.D. Ca. 1997) (same); Shores v. Publix Super Markets, Inc., No. 95-
1162, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3381, at **28-29 (M.D. Fla. 1996) (same).
104. See supra note 103.
105. See infra Part II(A)(3)(a).
106. Morgan, 169 F.R.D. at 358 (finding monetary relief to predominate and severing
the liability portion into an initial phase).
107. Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 421 (5th Cir. 1998) (disallowing
bifurcated procedure with respect to the "pattern or practice" claim alleged by the
plaintiffs).
108. Id. at 422.
109. Id.
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The Second Circuit in Robinson"' endorsed a bifurcated
procedure for a Title VII class action whereby the liability portion of
the "pattern-or-practice" claim is resolved prior to any additional
proceedings."' That court held that "litigating the pattern-or-practice
liability phase for the class as a whole would both reduce the range of
issues in dispute and promote judicial economy.'. 2  Therefore, the
Second Circuit has adopted a flexible approach to bifurcated hybrid
class certification while the Fifth Circuit, among others has adopted a
strict, inflexible approach.
A plain reading of Rule 23(c)(4) seems to allow this type of
certification."' The rule states that "[w]hen appropriate... an action
may be brought or maintained as a class action with respect to
particular issues... and the provisions of this rule shall then be
construed and applied accordingly."" 4  As the language of the rule
suggests, the court has the power to sever any issues that it deems
appropriate (including, presumably, liability issues) and try them
separately. In fact, the advisory committee's note to Rule 23(c)(4)
expressly endorses this type of procedure stating that in certain types
of cases an "action may retain its 'class' character only through the
adjudication of liability to the class; the members of the class may
thereafter be required to come in individually and prove the amounts
of their respective claims.''. With this in mind, it is difficult to see
how the Allison"" court could refuse to sever the liability issues that
were common to the entire class. Therefore, this type of certification,
which is allowable under the rule, should be available to district court
judges if they so desire to utilize it.
Seventh Amendment Issues
Another issue that the court must confront whenever it chooses
to bifurcate the proceeding is-how its decision will affect the parties'
Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial. Recent opinions by courts
deciding to bifurcate proceedings in a class action have recognized
potential Seventh Amendment"7  violations."' A Seventh
110. Robinson v. Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co., 267 F.3d 147 (2d Cir. 2001), cert.
denied, 2002 U.S. LEXIS 1894 (Mar. 18,2002).
111. Id. at 167-68.
112. Id. at 168.
113. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(4).
114. Id.
115. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(4) advisory committee's note.
116. 151 F.3d 402.
117. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
118. See Mullen v. Treasure Chest Casino, L.L.C., 186 F.3d 620, 632-33 (5th Cir. 1999),
cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1159 (2000); Blyden v. Mancusi, 186 F.3d 252, 268-69 (2d Cir. 1999);
Allison, 151 F.3d at 419-20; Cimino v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 151 F.3d 297, 311-21 (5th Cir.
1998); Chisolm v. Transouth Fin. Corp., 194 F.R.D. 538,552-54 (E.D. Va. 2000).
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Amendment violation can occur when different juries are asked to
decide the same issue or when a subsequent jury is asked to
reexamine issues decided by the previous jury, thus violating the so-
called reexamination clause.119 Although the Supreme Court has not
yet weighed in on the reexamination clause issue with respect to
bifurcated class action proceedings, many circuit and district courts
have, with varying results.2 °
When the court chooses to bifurcate the proceedings by
separating the liability from the damage issues, causation and reliance
are two areas that courts have found to overlap in many instances."'
In Mullen v. Treasure Chest Casino, LLC,"' a tort case alleging
negligence and unseaworthiness, the Fifth Circuit found that there
was little risk of reexamination where only the second jury would
consider the issues of causation."3 The trial plan certified by the
district judge would try the liability issues common to all class
members first in an initial trial phase.' If the plaintiffs prevailed in
the initial phase, the issues affecting only individual class members
would be tried in a second phase in waves of approximately five class
members at a time.' In the second phase, the issues would include
causation, damages, and comparative negligence. 6 The Mullen court
stated that since the second jury would be required to consider issues
of comparative fault, which has at its focus causation, it would be
inappropriate to allow the first jury to consider any causation issues.
In contrast, the Allison court found that the act of bifurcation
alone increased the probability of a Seventh Amendment violation so
that the class action device no longer remained superior.2 In that
case, the plaintiffs made the argument that the district court erred by
not partially certifying their disparate impact claim under Rule
23(b)(2) while deferring certification of their pattern or practice claim
under Rule 23(b)(3).'29 The court rejected that argument and held
that since the disparate impact claim shares factual issues with the
"pattern-or-practice" claim, the two could not be severed, as there
were overlapping issues.3
119. Blyden, 186 F.3d at 268.
120. See supra note 118.
121. With respect to causation see Mullen, 186 F.3d at 628-29. With respect to reliance
see Chisolm, 194 F.R.D. at 548.
122. 186 F.3d 620.
123. Id. at 629.
124. Id. at 623.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 628-29.
128. Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 419-20 (5th Cir. 1998).
129. Id. at 422.
130. Id. at 424.
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Courts have analyzed the reexamination clause of the Seventh
Amendment in either one of two circumstances: (1) after a bifurcated
proceeding has been completed,"' or (2) during the certification
phase of a potentially bifurcated trial.'32 How appellate courts have
dealt with Seventh Amendment issues after a trial has been
completed naturally has an effect on how the district courts currently
treat the issue during certification. As there has been a trend of late
by the circuit courts towards a more strict interpretation of the
Seventh Amendment, there has also been a trend by district courts
towards a reluctance to certify bifurcated proceedings so as not to
waste judicial resources because of the potential of a reversal on
Seventh Amendment grounds. '33 The irony in the class action context
is that very few of these cases actually go to trial because they settle.
Thus, there is normally no real risk of a Seventh Amendment
violation because a jury trial is unlikely. Therefore, a district court
should factor the likelihood of trial into the Seventh Amendment
analysis. Since a district judge cannot tell for certain whether a case
will go to trial, an approach whereby the court will assume that the
case will not be tried with the understanding that it can exercise its
power under Rule 23(c)(1) to decertify or amend its certification
order later if trial becomes likely, would be preferable.'34
Courts have dealt with potential Seventh Amendment violations
in a number of ways. As already discussed, in Mullen, the court found
that leaving the issues of causation to the second jury alleviated any
potential Seventh Amendment concerns that may have existed.'35
Although the court was merely affirming a certification decision
made by the lower court and not reviewing a jury verdict, the court's
willingness to take a practical view of the Seventh Amendment
allowed an otherwise legitimate class to go forward. Another
approach that has been taken is to try the legal issues first to a single
131. See Blyden v. Mancusi, 186 F.3d 252,268-69,271 (2d Cir. 1999).
132. See Mullen, 186 F.3d at 628-29.
133. Chisolm v. Transouth Fin. Corp., 194 F.R.D. 538, 552-54 (E.D. Va. 2000)
(performing a rigorous analysis of potential Seventh Amendment concerns in light of
recent appellate court decisions).
134. Generally speaking, over 90% of all civil lawsuits filed in federal courts settle or
are disposed of prior to trial. See Victor E. Schwartz, et al., Reining in Punitive Damages
"Run Wild": Proposals for Reform by Courts and Legislatures, 65 BROOKLYN L. REV.
1003, 1011 (1999) (stating that 90% of all cases are either settled or disposed of without
trial). This number may actually be higher for class actions. See R. Chris Heck,
Comment, Conflict and Aggregation: Appointing Institutional Investors as Sole Lead
Plaintiffs Under the PSLRA, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1199, 1222 n. 128 (1999) (stating that 93%
of securities cases settle without trial).
135. 186 F.3d at 628-29.
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jury and preserve the equitable issues for the second phase.136  One
problem with this approach is that damage issues cannot be resolved
without first establishing liability. Once liability is established, the
equitable claims resolve themselves in most instances. Therefore, the
court is merely proposing that there be one trial with one jury that
resolves'most of the class-wide issues. In fact, the use of a single jury,
which will examine all the issues in a case, is another approach taken
by courts.'37 The main problem with a single jury is that of
manageability. Manageability is a concern because the court is faced
with complex issues such as the order of the trial and the length of
trial. However, the court may be able to alleviate some of the
manageability issues by dividing the class into more manageable
subclasses using Rule 23(c)(4), 3' in order to promote the orderly
presentation and organization of evidence.
At least one commentator has suggested that the recent
interpretation by courts of the reexamination clause of the Seventh
Amendment is unnecessarily restrictive.'39 Professor Woolley has
suggested that the reexamination clause merely requires that
subsequent juries "respect the formal findings of the first jury.)1 40 He
goes on to state that "there is no sound basis for concluding that the
convocation of a second jury.. . will necessarily lead to violation of
the Seventh Amendment.''4 Although there is a circuit split on this
issue, some courts apparently agree with Professor Woolley.' 2  For
136. See Lemon v. Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, 216 F.3d 577, 582 (7th Cir. 2000)
(stating that a district court that chooses divided certification must adjudicate the damage
claims first, even of the adjudication of those claims decides the equitable claims as well).
137. Chisolm, 194 F.R.D. at 554 (recognizing that the use of a single jury may be a
constitutionally viable solution); but see Miller v. Hygrade Food Prods. Corp., 198 F.R.D.
638, 644 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (finding it "highly impractical to have one jury weigh all the
evidence within the liability phase and then apply that presumption, if so found, to each
of' the class members).
138. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4).
139. Patrick Woolley, Mass Tort Litigation and the Seventh Amendment Reexamination
Clause, 83 IOWA L. REV. 499 (1998).
140. Id. at 542.
141. Id. at 543.
142. See Robinson v. Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co., 267 F.3d 147, 170 (2d Cir.
2001), cert. denied, 2002 U.S. LEXIS 1894 (Mar. 18, 2002) (stating that Seventh
Amendment concerns could be dealt with in a Title VII claim); Valentino v. Carter-
Wallace, Inc., 97 F.3d 1227, 1232 (9th Cir. 1996) (dismissing concerns that the bifurcation
of the trial will result in successive juries examining the same issues); In re Copley Pharm.,
Inc., 161 F.R.D. 456, 461 (D. Wyo. 1995) (stating that finding a potential Seventh
Amendment violation from bifurcation "effectively eviscerates... 23(c)(4)(A) and was in
conflict with the advisory committee notes), rev'd on other grounds, 132 F.3d 42 (10th Cir.
1997). But see Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 422-24 (5th Cir. 1998)
(holding that there is no appropriate way to bifurcate a Title VII class such that the
Seventh Amendment would not be violated); In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d
1293, 1303-04 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that Seventh Amendment concerns worked against
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now, the Seventh Amendment may stand in the way of potential
classes seeking a bifurcated certification depending on the circuit in
which the class action is brought.
(4) Certify a Rule 23(b) (2) Class for Liability and a (b) (3) Class for
Damages
The fourth way in which district courts have certified hybrid
classes is to bifurcate the proceedings and certify the portion of the
class seeking injunctive relief under Rule 23(b)(2) and the portion
seeking monetary relief under Rule 23(b)(3).' 3 This method is
basically indistinguishable from the certification method discussed in
subsection (C) above except that the district court will certify the
monetary relief under Rule 23(b)(3) in the initial stages of the
litigation. A court using this procedure will avoid the potential waste
of judicial resources if the damage portion of the action would later
prove to be unmanageable, after a plaintiff verdict in the initial phase.
On the other hand, a court that would find the injunctive relief
appropriate under Rule 23(b)(2) but the monetary relief
inappropriate under (b)(3) may be costing both parties the
opportunity to obtain a preclusive decision, at least with respect to
liability. This is because a verdict for either the plaintiff class or the
defendant in an initial trial for liability will result in issue preclusion
for any subsequent proceedings that individual class members may
wish to pursue. Under Rule 23(c)(4) the court has the discretion to
sever issues as it sees fit and either this approach or that taken in
subsection (3) would be allowable.
The same Seventh Amendment concerns that were stated above
apply to this type of certification procedure. Indeed, this approach
may provide the only true assessment of the potential reexamination
problems since the structure of the entire action can be analyzed. A
court that is deferring certification of the damage claims until a later
certification of the products liability case. The court stated that there was no way to
separate the issues of liability from those of damages in such a way so as not to violate the
Seventh Amendment.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 867 (1995).
143. See Beck v. Boeing Co., 203 F.R.D. 459, 465-68 (W.D. Wash. 2001) (certifying
employment discrimination class under Rule 23(b)(2) for a determination of liability and
under Rule 23(b)(3) for punitive damages); Beckman v. CBS, Inc., 192 F.R.D. 608,615 (D.
Minn. 2000) (certifying a bifurcated class proceeding using the "procedures of Rule
23(b)(2)" to resolve the issues of liability and the "'opt-out' procedures established for
Rule 23(b)(3)" to resolve the issues of damages); Ballard v. Equifax Check Serv., Inc., 186
F.R.D. 589, 596-600 (E.D. Cal. 1999) (certifying FDCPA class under Rule 23(b)(2) for a
determination of liability, declaratory relief, and statutory damages and under Rule
23(b)(3) for a determination of the actual damages); Irwin v. Mascott, 96 F. Supp. 2d 968,
979-82 (N.D. Cal. 1999) (certifying a Rule 23(b)(2) class for those plaintiffs that did not
incur actual damages in the FDCPA action and a Rule 23(b)(3) class for those that did
incur actual damages).
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stage will likely not consider all the potential Seventh Amendment
problems that might arise. The analysis employed by courts,
however, should remain the same as described above."'
(5) Certify the Entire Action Under Rule 23(b)(3)
A final way in which a district court may certify a hybrid class is
by relying on Rule 23(b)(3) exclusively.'45 In Jefferson v. Ingersoll
International Inc.,'46 the Seventh Circuit stated that "[w]hen
substantial damages have been sought, the most appropriate
approach is that of Rule 23(b)(3), because it allows notice and an
opportunity to opt-out."'47 The court may choose this approach if it
finds that, under Rule 23(b)(2) the monetary relief requested
predominates over the injunctive or declaratory relief, thereby
making a (b)(2) certification inappropriate.' Also, where a court
finds that a bifurcated proceeding would be unmanageable or would
violate the Seventh Amendment, the court may find that a Rule
23(b)(3) certification would be a better option. However, individual
issues could predominate in the action and make a Rule 23(b)(3)
certification inappropriate.49 Therefore, manageability and Seventh
Amendment concerns are not unique to bifurcated proceedings and
may signal that class treatment is inappropriate even under this
subsection for a given claim.'
As this option is listed last in this note, it should also be the last
option that courts consider.' In Deboer v. Mellon Mortgage Co.,'52
the Eighth Circuit held that where either Rule 23(b)(1) or (b)(2) are
applicable, "(b)(3) should not be used, so as to avoid unnecessary
inconsistencies and compromises in future litigation.', 5 3 Presumably,
the court is referring to the ability of class members to opt-out of
Rule 23(b)(3) classes. Inconsistencies and compromises could result
if a substantial number of plaintiffs opt-out of the litigation and
144. See supra Part II (A)(3).
145. See Connor v. Automated Accounts, Inc., 202 F.R.D. 265, 270-71 (E.D. Wash.
2001) (certifying FDCPA class under only Rule 23(b)(3) after finding that the monetary
relief predominated over the equitable relief); Ansoumana v. Gristede's Operating Corp.,
201 F.R.D. 81, 87-88 (S.D. N.Y. 2001) (certifying FLSA class under Rule 23(b)(3) after
finding that the monetary relief predominated).
146. 195 F.3d 894 (7th Cir. 1999).
147. Id. at 898. See also Lemon v. Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, 216 F.3d 577, 581
(7th Cir. 2000).
148. Jefferson v. Ingersoll Int'l, Inc., 195 F.3d 894, 897-98 (7th Cir. 1999).
149. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).
150. See, e.g., Mullen v. Treasure Chest Casino, L.L.C., 186 F.3d 620 (5th Cir. 1999).
151. Deboer v. Mellon Mortg. Co., 64 F.3d 1171, 1175 (8th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 517
U.S. 1156 (1996).
152. Id.
153. Id. at 1175.
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pursue individual litigation that reaches different results. Therefore,
the district court should first find that Rule 23(b)(2) does not apply to
the hybrid action in order to certify the entire action under Rule
23(b)(3). Also, if any portion of the action could be certified under
Rule 23(b)(2) using the court's power under Rule 23(c)(4) to
subclass, then it should do that first before considering certification
exclusively under Rule 23(b)(3). This would mean that using a
bifurcated proceeding is preferable and should be required if issues
can be severed from the litigation in such a way so as to satisfy Rule
23(b)(2). Therefore, this procedure, in a hybrid class context, is one
of last resort when the previous four methods are unavailable.
IH.A Solution to the Problem with Hybrid Classes
There is no one thing that can be done to make the certification
of hybrid classes more consistent and predictable. It is possible that
the Advisory Committee could propose an amendment to Rule 23,
which would then be adopted by the Supreme Court in an effort to
address the problem."4 However, an amendment will likely create
more confusion than it would solve. This is because, as has been
demonstrated, courts cannot yet agree on the meaning of the current
rules with respect to hybrid classes. A new subsection to Rule 23 may
just add to the already complex landscape that courts must navigate
through. Also, even if an effective amendment were drafted, getting
it adopted is an entirely different story. '55 Therefore, realistically any
solution must come from guidance provided by either the Supreme
Court"5 6 or the various circuit courts.
The Supreme Court could grant certiorari to a Circuit Court case
that would effectively deal with these certification issues.' 7 However,
whether the Supreme Court grants certiorari in any particular case is
154. The Federal Rules can be amended though a process whereby the Judicial
Conference, working through the Advisory Committee, proposes amendments to the
United States Supreme Court. The Supreme Court then has the power to actually amend
the rules. The rules then take effect if Congress does nothing to change what the Supreme
Court drafted. See 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1994) (Rules Enabling Act); see also Linda S.
Mullenix, The Constitutionality of the Proposed Rule 23 Class Action Amendments, 39
ARIZ. L. REV. 615, 617 (1997).
155. See Mullenix, supra note 154, at 617.
156. The Supreme Court almost provided guidance in Ticor Title Insurance Co. v.
Brown when, in dismissing cert., the court stated that it is "at least a substantial
possibility," that actions seeking monetary relief could only be certified under Rule
23(b)(3). 511 U.S. 117, 121 (1994). Although any word from the Supreme Court is
influential, this guidance is the most non-influential type of dicta because the Court here is
not deciding anything.
157. As stated before, the Court has suggested that Rule 23(b)(2) may never be
appropriate for the adjudication of monetary claims, but has not yet so held. Brown, 511
U.S. at 121.
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not very predictable and may be a result of what the Court deems to
be important for consideration. Therefore, this author proposes that
the solution to the class certification problem presented in this note
should be adopted by all federal courts so as to infuse some
consistency and predictability into the current process. The proposed
solution will draw from current circuit court cases for support, so as to
reflect the current state of the law.
As stated above, some courts have used only Rule 23(b)(2) for
certification of hybrid classes. '58 As has been shown, some courts
have done so without providing absent class members notice or the
opportunity to opt-out of the litigation.'59 There are advantages to
both parties if the court decides to use this approach. The plaintiffs
would always prefer to have the court consider certification under the
requirements of Rule 23(b)(2) instead of (b)(3) because there is a
much lower hurdle that they must clear to achieve certification. The
defendants, in many cases, also would prefer to have the class
certified under Rule 23(b)(2) instead of (b)(3) or any other
certification that would allow absent class member to opt-out,
because, if they win, they can bind the entire class to the judgment.
However, as has been discussed, the Supreme Court's decision in
Ortiz"' may limit the use of mandatory classes, such as a Rule
23(b)(2) class, when the absent class members are having the
monetary claims adjudicated without being given notice or the
opportunity to opt-out of the litigation.'61
Other courts that have used Rule 23(b)(2) to certify hybrid
classes have done so while giving the absent class members notice and
the opportunity to opt-out of the litigation.'62  The principle
advantages to a Rule 23(b)(2) certification with notice and opt-out
rights given to absent class members mirror the advantages from the
previously mentioned approach with one exception. That exception
being that the defendants lose the ability to bind all the potential class
members due to the availability of opt-out rights for absent class
members. Keeping in mind the Supreme Court's due process
concerns that were expressed in Ortiz,' nonetheless, this approach
may be an equitable trade-off between the parties seeking a speedy
and complete resolution and the courts seeking to satisfy
constitutional minimums.
158. See supra notes 65-99.
159. See supra note 65.
160. Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999).
161. Id. at 846-47.
162. See supra note 158.
163. 527 U.S. 815.
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With respect to certifying hybrid classes under Rule 23(b)(2), the
incidental damages approach taken by Allison"' is the most
appropriate test for courts to use. The incidental damages approach
ensures that Rule 23(b)(2) is only used to certify classes with
monetary claims when the "damages [will] flow directly from liability
to the class as a whole on the claims forming the basis of the
injunctive or declaratory relief."'65 This approach best comports with
the advisory committee's dictate that the monetary relief not
predominate over the injunctive or declaratory relief requested.
Also, this approach allows for greater certainty on the part of both
courts and parties seeking to certify a hybrid class.'66
The so-called "ad hoc" approach, endorsed by the Second Circuit
in Robinson,"6' results in the exact opposite result, namely a lack of
certainty and predictability. This is easily demonstrated by examining
some of the cases that utilize the ad hoc approach. One district court,
applying an ad hoc balancing approach, held that injunctive relief
predominated when it "is the form of relief in which the plaintiffs are
primarily interested."'' 8  Similarly, another court found that the
monetary relief sought was secondary to the injunctive relief
requested because the injunctive relief sought "will affect more
persons and have consequences over a greater period of time than"
the monetary relief."9 These cases show that there is a major
subjective component to this type of approach, which does not lend
itself to certainty or predictability. Therefore, as stated above, the
incidental damages approach should be used by courts and endorsed
164. Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402 (5th Cir. 1998).
165. 1& at 415 (emphasis in original).
166. It can be argued that Rule 23(b)(2) can never be used to certify claims that request
monetary relief. The text of the advisory committee's note to Rule 23(b)(2) states that
(b)(2) is "intended to reach situations where a party has taken action or refused to take
action with respect to a class, and final relief of an injunctive nature or of a corresponding
declaratory nature ... is appropriate." Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 advisory committee's note. The
note goes on to state that (b)(2) does not "extend to cases in which the appropriate final
relief relates exclusively or predominately to money damages." Id. The committee is
merely stating what is not appropriate for treatment under Rule 23(b)(2). Therefore, the
predominance requirement of Rule 23(b)(2) may not be a requirement at all because the
advisory committee notes merely reflect the intention of the advisory committee when the
Rule is either drafted or amended. If it were truly a requirement, then presumably it
would appear in the text of the Rule itself. This argument is supported by the fact that the
Supreme Court, in dismissing a case that it has granted certiorari to, stated that there is a
"substantial possibility" that monetary damage claims could "only be certified under Rule
23(b)(3)." Ticor Title Ins. Co. v. Brown, 511 U.S. 117, 121 (1994) (emphasis added).
167. Robinson v. Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co., 267 F.3d 147, 162-63 (2d Cir. 2001),
cert. denied, 2002 U.S. LEXIS 1894 (Mar. 18, 2002).
168. Hoffman v. Honda of Am. Mfg., Inc., 191 F.R.D. 530, 535-36 (S.D. Ohio 1999).
169. Ballard v. Equifax Check Servs., Inc., 186 F.R.D. 589, 596 (E.D. Cal. 1999).
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by the Supreme Court for hybrid classes seeking certification under
Rule 23(b) (2).
Courts should depart from the Fifth Circuit's approach in
Allison, however, and be willing to certify a hybrid class using a
bifurcated approach where liability and equitable issues could be
resolved using Rule 23(b)(2) and damage determinations could be
deferred or certified under Rule 23(b)(3). The bifurcated approach
to hybrid class certification was expressly rejected by the Fifth Circuit
in Allison.' The Allison court did so by analyzing the individual
questions presented by the damage claims asserted by each class
member."" The court concluded that certifying a Rule 23(b)(3) class
with respect to the compensatory and punitive damage claims
asserted by the class would be inappropriate because common
questions did not predominate and because of the potential for
manageability problems that could be encountered when bifurcated
proceedings were used.'72
On the other hand, the Second Circuit in Robinson held that a
hybrid class could be bifurcated using Rule 23(c)(4)(A) when the
plaintiffs sought certification under Rule 23(b)(2) for a liability
determination only."3 The court held that "litigating the... liability
phase for the class as a whole would both reduce the range of issues in
dispute and promote judicial economy." '' The court elaborated by
stating that if the plaintiffs were to succeed, the issues and evidence
needed to adjudicate any individual questions that would remain
would be substantially narrowed while a successful verdict for the
defendants would eliminate the need entirely for a remedial stage.7
A comparison of these two important cases shows that they can
be reconciled into an approach whereby a bifurcated proceeding
would be both allowable under the Rule, and maybe even desirable.
Clearly, the text of Rule 23(c)(4)(A) allows a district court to certify a
class with respect to certain issues,"7 6 i.e. limiting certification of the
Rule 23(b)(2) initial phase class to the issues of liability and equitable
relief. Indeed, both the Allison and Robinson courts agree that
certification of a Rule 23(b)(2) class for liability issues would be
170. Allison, 151 F.3d at 20-21.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Robinson v. Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co., 267 F.3d 147, 168 (2001), cert.
denied, 2002 U.S. LEXIS 1894 (Mar. 18,2002).
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4)(A).
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appropriate.1" The Fifth Circuit, however, denied certification to the
entire class on the basis of both potential Seventh Amendment
violations and no showing that the second phase could be certified
under Rule 23(b)(3).' As to the latter concern by the Fifth Circuit, it
is reasonable, and maybe even preferable, for a court dealing with a
bifurcated hybrid class to determine whether the second phase could
be certified after conclusion of the first phase. The Allison court
merely affirmed the district court's exercise of discretion in finding
that common issues did not predominate as to the Rule 23(b)(3)
certification."9 The Second Circuit in Robinson did not feel that it
was necessary to get to the issue of (b)(3) certification as it had
already decided that the class should proceed under Rule 23(b)(2)."'
Therefore, certification of the second phase of a bifurcated hybrid
class action should proceed as any other Rule 23(b)(3) certification
would proceed.
As to the Allison court's former concern, the potential Seventh
Amendment violation, courts should adopt a liberal view of the
reexamination clause in light of the highly speculative nature of any
potential violation and in light of the fact that most class actions settle
prior to trial. As suggested by Professor Woolley, it is not necessary
to conclude that bifurcated proceedings will naturally lead to a
Seventh Amendment violation; all that is necessary is that the second
jury "respect the formal findings of the first jury.''. Since no Seventh
Amendment violation can occur in the absence of a trial, a court
should readily factor in the likelihood of trial into its analysis.
Therefore, it should be a rare case when the potential for a Seventh
Amendment violation precludes certification of a hybrid class.
A court can pursue a bifurcated approach in one of two ways.
First, courts can certify the initial phase for liability and/or equitable
issues and defer certification of the second phase. A court may be
reluctant to use this type of certification as it may result in a waste of
both judicial and party resources. Plaintiffs, or more specifically
plaintiff's attorneys, may be unwilling to embark upon expensive and
costly litigation if it is not certain whether the action will be allowed
to proceed past the initial phase. Defendants, on the other hand, may
welcome this type of certification because a victory in the initial phase
would result in a great deal of savings with a loss putting the
defendant no worse off than it would have been.
177. See Allison, 151 F.3d at 422 (stating that resolution of the entire disparate impact
claim under Rule 23(b)(2) could conceivably narrow the issues to be tried in a pattern or
practice claim); Robinson, 267 F.3d at 168 (same).
178. Allison, 151 F.3d at 419-23.
179. Id at 422.
180. Robinson, 267 F.3d at 167 n.12.
181. Woolley, supra note 139, at 542.
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A court may also find that after the resolution of liability in favor
of the plaintiffs, the case would become unmanageable if it were tried
on a class basis with respect to the damage claims. However, this
might not be all bad if an injunction could be issued as a result of the
successful liability phase. If, on the other hand, the liability phase is
resolved in favor of the defendant(s), then the procedure is very
efficient for the court and the parties. These considerations, although
logical, are not usually of paramount importance as most class actions
settle long before reaching trial. Therefore, the court that allows a
partial certification is doing so with the goal of promoting settlement,
in many cases and in that sense, liberal certification definitely favors
plaintiffs in most cases as it "can put considerable pressure on the
defendant to settle, even when the plaintiff's probability of success on
the merits is slight." '' s
Second, courts can certify a Rule 23(b)(2) class for resolution of
liability and equitable issues and a Rule 23(b)(3) class for resolution
of the damage issues in the action. This approach may provide the
best practical approach to courts seeking to give neither side an unfair
tactical advantage. As mentioned above, the court that certifies the
injunctive relief under Rule 23(b)(2) while deferring certification of
the monetary claims gives an advantage to the plaintiff because it may
put additional pressure on the defendant to settle, regardless of the
chance for later certification of the monetary claims. With this
approach, a defendant will know conclusively if it must face the
prospect of a trial as to all issues in the case. This may encourage
settlements that are fair, since both parties may adequately assess
their own exposure risk in a potential trial.
In summary, courts should begin to infuse more predictability
and certainty into hybrid class certification. This is accomplished in
two ways. First, limit Rule 23(b)(2) certifications to instances where
the monetary relief sought by the class is truly incidental to the
injunctive relief sought. The ad hoc approach used by a minority of
courts to determine whether monetary relief predominates suffers
from a lack of predictability, a fatal flaw. Second, courts should
uniformly endorse the use of bifurcated proceedings for hybrid
classes, whereby the liability and equitable issues would be resolved
through the use of Rule 23(b)(2) and the remaining damage issues are
resolved in a second phase, if necessary, presumably under Rule
23(b)(3). 3
182. Blair v. Equifax Check Servs., Inc., 181 F.3d 832, 834 (7th Cir. 1999).
183. One influential commentator has suggested that courts take one of four
approaches when certifying hybrid classes. See NEWBERG & CONTE, supra note 10, § 4.14
(stating that where both equitable and monetary relief is sought, the court can either limit
the Rule 23(b)(2) certification to certain issues only, certify the injunction claims under
Rule 23(b)(2) and the damages claims under Rule 23(b)(3), certify the entire class initially
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To foster this approach, the Federal Judicial Center should
endorse a solution to the hybrid class problem by way of an
amendment to the Manual for Complex Litigation ("Manual").'
84
Since the Manual is referred to quite frequently by the federal courts,
it could be very influential in helping to shape future certification
decisions of mixed relief classes. Currently, the Manual does not
specifically address the issue of hybrid classes, but it does discuss both
the idea of using subclasses for particular issues... and the idea of
bifurcating employment discrimination classes into two different
phases."6 The Manual states that "class certification may be limited
to the (b)(2) issue (class-wide liability and injunctive relief), with all
other claims proceeding as separate actions but contingent on the
outcome of the (b)(2) trial.""'
The Manual is currently being revised and should be amended to
reflect the approach described in this note. Specifically, the Federal
Judicial Center should endorse the use of a bifurcated proceeding
with hybrid classes and should endorse the idea that Rule 23(b)(2)
should not be used to certify monetary claims which are not
incidental to the equitable relief sought by the class. The language in
the Manual currently states that incidental damages may be recovered
in a Rule 23(b)(2) class and endorses the bifurcated procedure, at
least with respect to employment discrimination claims."' However,
as has been noted above, the hybrid class issue arises in a number of
different contexts apart from the employment discrimination area.
Therefore, the Manual should endorse a procedure to be used by all
hybrid classes, which would begin the process of developing a
uniform standard for hybrid class certification.
Conclusion
Regardless of the manner in which a solution to the hybrid class
problem comes about, a solution is ultimately needed. Currently,
class action plaintiffs are faced with a great deal of unpredictability
when attempting to certify a hybrid class. This unpredictability may
force the plaintiffs to abandon some of the class's claims in order to
under Rule 23(b)(2), bifurcate the trial so that the defendant's liability is determined
initially, and reconsider class certification if the plaintiffs are successful at the liability
stage, or certify only certain claims or issues under Rule 23(b)(2) and treat the
nondesignated claims or issues as individual or incidental to be determined separately
after liability has been established).
184. MANUAL, supra note 56
185. Id. § 30.17.
186. Id. §§ 33.52,33.54.
187. Id. § 33.54.
188. Id.
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ensure certification.' On the other side, the defendant has no way of
knowing how to defend against a hybrid certification because it may
not know which method the court will ultimately use to certify the
class. As the cases have illustrated, the issue has reached the point
where the Supreme Court needs to step in and begin to provide
guidance to the lower courts by granting certiorari to address the
hybrid class issue.
189. But even this may prove to be a catch-22. At least one court has stated that it
would be concerned if the class representatives did not bring all of the plaintiffs' potential
claims and the failure to do so may actually prevent certification on the basis of
inadequate representation. Smith v. Texaco, Inc., 88 F. Supp. 2d 663, 679 (E.D. Tex.
2000), rev'd, 263 F.3d 394 (5th Cir. 2001).
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